Expert Comment — Europe Programme
15 January 2026
France has long been the most vocal advocate of European “strategic autonomy” — the idea that Europe must develop the capacity to defend itself independent of the United States. Under President Macron, this concept has moved from a fringe aspiration to a central pillar of French and increasingly European defence policy. But as the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year and Washington’s commitment to European security becomes less certain, the gap between France’s strategic ambitions and its actual capabilities has become increasingly difficult to bridge.
The Strategic Rationale
The French argument for strategic autonomy rests on three premises. First, the United States is an unreliable security partner whose strategic priorities are shifting from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The Trump era demonstrated that American security guarantees could not be taken for granted; the Biden era demonstrated that even a transatlanticist administration had limits to its willingness to commit resources to European defence. Second, Europe’s security interests are not identical to those of the United States, particularly in the Mediterranean, the Sahel and the Middle East. Third, the development of a genuine European defence capability would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance by making Europe a more capable and credible partner.
Strategic autonomy is not about leaving NATO. It is about Europe taking responsibility for its own security so that the Alliance can function as a genuine partnership of equals rather than a relationship of dependency.
Capabilities vs Ambitions
The gap between France’s strategic ambitions and its military capabilities is substantial and growing. France’s defence budget, while increased significantly to €50 billion in 2025, still represents only 2.1 per cent of GDP — just above the NATO target but well below the levels maintained by the United States and the United Kingdom in per capita terms. More importantly, the French military is stretched thin across multiple theatres — from the Baltic to the Sahel to the Indo-Pacific — with limited capacity for strategic reinforcement.
The French nuclear deterrent, while politically significant, does not translate into conventional capability. The country’s aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, is frequently in maintenance. Its army, while highly professional, numbers only 120,000 troops — smaller than the Turkish or Greek armies. The defence industrial base, while advanced in niche areas, lacks the scale to compete with American or Chinese producers.
The European Dimension
France’s approach to European defence has evolved significantly under Macron. The initial emphasis on autonomous European action has given way to a more pragmatic approach that seeks to build European capabilities within and alongside NATO. The European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework and the European Peace Facility represent tangible steps toward greater European defence cooperation, though their impact remains limited relative to the scale of the challenge.