The 5,000 Missing Specialists: Why Australia’s Six Nuclear Submarines Require a Workforce of Nuclear Engineers That Does Not Exist in a Country Without Nuclear Power

Expert Comment — Pacific Programme

2026-04-08

TAustralia’s nuclear submarine programme, the most expensive defence project in the country’s history at over $300 billion, faces a fundamental constraint that no amount of money can quickly solve. The programme requires a workforce of 5,000 to 7,000 nuclear-qualified engineers, technicians, welders, and quality assurance specialists. Australia’s nuclear industry currently employs fewer than 100 people with relevant expertise. The country has no nuclear power plants, no undergraduate nuclear engineering degree programmes, and no regulatory framework for naval nuclear propulsion. The workforce that is essential to the AUKUS submarine pathway does not exist and will take years to create.

Australia’s universities offer no undergraduate degree in nuclear engineering. The only postgraduate programmes in nuclear engineering are small and focused on medical and research applications, not naval propulsion. A nuclear submarine engineer requires training in reactor physics, nuclear thermodynamics, radiation shielding, nuclear materials, and nuclear safety, none of which is systematically taught in Australian universities. The government has announced partnerships with universities in the United Kingdom and the United States to provide training for Australian engineers, but these programmes have limited capacity and will produce only a few hundred graduates per year. At current rates, it will take over a decade to train the workforce needed for the submarine programme.

The skills shortage extends beyond engineers. Nuclear welding, a specialised skill requiring certification and extensive experience, is critical for submarine construction. Australia has fewer than 50 certified nuclear welders. The submarine programme will require over 500. Training a nuclear welder takes two to three years. The competition for qualified welders between the submarine programme and other defence and infrastructure projects is intense. The workforce constraint is the single greatest risk to the AUKUS timeline.

Australia is not alone in facing workforce shortages. The United States and the United Kingdom are also struggling to maintain their nuclear submarine workforces. The US Navy’s submarine construction backlog exceeds ten years, driven in part by workforce shortages at General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding. The UK’s Dreadnought submarine programme has faced similar challenges. The AUKUS partners are competing with each other for the same limited pool of skilled workers. The agreement to allow Australian engineers to train in UK and US facilities will help but will also drain skilled workers from British and American programmes.

Australia is attempting to build a nuclear submarine industry in a country that has never operated a nuclear power plant, has no nuclear engineering programmes, and has no nuclear workforce. The resource challenge is unprecedented.

Major defence procurement programmes consistently experience cost overruns. The US Virginia-class submarine programme experienced cost growth of over 30 per cent. The UK Dreadnought programme has faced similar challenges. Australia’s own Hunter-class frigate programme, initially budgeted at $35 billion, has faced cost increases. The AUKUS submarine programme, with its combination of technological complexity, industrial base challenges, and workforce constraints, is at high risk of cost escalation that could add tens of billions of dollars to the total programme cost.

The strategic logic of AUKUS rests on assumptions about China’s future military trajectory that may or may not prove correct. If China’s economic growth slows, its military ambitions moderate, or its political system undergoes change, the $300 billion investment in nuclear submarines may prove unnecessary. If China’s military expansion continues, the submarines will be essential. The debate about AUKUS is ultimately a debate about the future strategic environment. The assumptions underlying the programme deserve more rigorous scrutiny than they have received in Australian public debate.

Proponents of AUKUS argue that nuclear-powered submarines are essential for Australian sovereignty in an increasingly contested strategic environment. The argument is that only nuclear submarines provide the range, endurance, and stealth necessary to deter potential adversaries and protect Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. The sovereignty argument is powerful but not unqualified. Sovereignty depends not only on military capability but also on economic strength, diplomatic skill, and social cohesion. A $300 billion investment in submarines that diverts resources from other defence priorities, constrains the defence budget for decades, and reduces fiscal flexibility could ultimately undermine rather than enhance Australia’s sovereign capacity. The sovereignty argument must be assessed against the opportunity cost of the submarine programme, not in isolation.

The technology transfer arrangements under AUKUS are unprecedented in their ambition and complexity. The United States has agreed to share sensitive nuclear propulsion technology that it has not shared with any other country, including the United Kingdom. The transfer requires amendments to US export control legislation, the establishment of new security frameworks, and the negotiation of technology protection agreements. The complexity of the technology transfer arrangements creates risks of delay, misunderstanding, and dispute. The history of major technology transfer programmes demonstrates that they consistently take longer and cost more than initially anticipated. The technology transfer dimension of AUKUS is as challenging as the workforce dimension.

The AUKUS submarine pathway has an extended timeline that creates risks of technological obsolescence, budget overruns, and changing strategic priorities. The first Australian-built SSN-AUKUS submarine is not expected to enter service until the early 2040s, nearly two decades from now. The strategic environment in the 2040s may look very different from the strategic environment today. China’s military capabilities, the state of US-China relations, the evolution of naval technology, and the fiscal position of the Australian government are all uncertain over this time horizon. The extended timeline of the AUKUS programme creates risks that must be recognised and managed.

The AUKUS programme is not only a defence procurement but also an industrial policy. The government has committed to maximising Australian industry involvement in the programme, creating jobs, building industrial capabilities, and supporting economic development. The industrial policy objectives of the programme are important but may conflict with the defence objectives. Maximising Australian industry involvement could increase costs and extend timelines. Balancing the industrial and defence objectives of the programme will be a continuing challenge for the Australian government.